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Abstract -Shelby County v. Holder has struck down of section 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (VRA) which has initiated a wave of new state legislation that implements stricter 
voting restrictions, specifically voter identification laws. This project seeks to examine the 
potential for these new restrictions to decrease voter turnout, specifically non-white or minority 
turnout. The independent variables I examine are voter identification laws, felon 
disenfranchisement and non-white House congressional representation, to determine their effect 
on electoral outcomes, specifically voter turnout and voter registration rates. My findings 
indicate that voter identification laws and felon disenfranchisement create environments adverse 
to electoral participation, while attempts to increase non-white representation fail to increase 
electoral access among minority voters. This analysis has implications for the future of electoral 
access in the 2014 midterm and 2016 presidential elections, especially in regard to youth and 
minority voter turnout. !
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 In the wake of the Shelby County v. Holder Supreme Court Decision, Congress is left to 
decide whether or not to implement a new coverage formula to replace Section 4(b) and 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, which was struck down as unconstitutional. The Voting Rights Amendment 
Act of 2014 was introduced in January as an attempt to strength the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in 
the wake of Shelby. However, this remedy is an inadequate response to the judicial call for 
changes in the VRA as well as the increasing prominence of restrictions on voting such as voter 
identification requirements. Additionally, Eric Holder the Attorney General recently condemned 
state restrictions on felon voting, arguing permanent disenfranchisement increases the likelihood 
of felons committing more crimes in the future. I would like to expand Holder’s call for the 
repeal of all restrictions on felon voting, since they not only negatively impact felons, but also 
voting communities. As such I seek to explore the negative impact of voting restrictions and 
determine whether they cause hostile voting environments for minorities or other socioeconomic 
groups. 
 This paper seeks not to reaffirm the voting rights coverage formula which was struck 
down by the Supreme Court, but to determine whether there are new forms of voter suppression. 
My general hypothesis is that there are new barriers or second-generation barriers to voting 
access which need to be addressed by Congress to ensure enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. 
Much of the data used to determine pre-clearance in section 5 of the VRA was based on data 
from the 1970’s and 1960’s, which focused on barriers such as literacy tests and poll taxes. My 
dependent variable is turnout and registration rates, which measures the electoral access of 
different electorates based on their race, income, age, party identification and education. My 
independent variables are the presence of voter identification laws, the presence of felon 
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disenfranchisement restrictions and the presence of a non-white member of Congress. The null 
hypothesis is that none of my independent variables have an effect on electoral access. My first 
hypothesis is that the higher the prevalence of voter identification laws, the lower the electoral 
access. My second hypothesis is that as felon voting disenfranchisement increases, electoral 
access will decrease. My third hypothesis is that the presence of a non-white house member will 
increase electoral access. My units of analysis are states, with congressional districts as an 
additional unit of analysis. By examining the possibility of newer ways to suppress electoral 
access, this thesis is able to provide an updated understanding of inconspicuous legislative 
attempts to block electoral participation. 
!
Literature Review 
 What causes minority turnout to be depressed? This thesis seeks to examine how certain 
barriers to voting, specifically voter identification laws, felon disenfranchisement and non-white 
Congressional representation, affect the turnout and registration rates of minorities. Using survey 
level aggregated to the state and congressional level, I use logistic regressions to determine how 
each of these independent variables affect minority turnout, as well as other socioeconomic 
groups. In this literature review, I will first broadly establish the voter turnout literature and then 
move to discuss the existing literature regarding each of my independent variables. This will help 
to establish previous discussions on voter turnout and voting behavior while establishing the  
context of voting rights.  
!
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 While Congress has introduced legislation to strengthen the Voting Rights Act through 
the the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 2014, this legislation fails to revamp federal oversight 
of electoral suppression. This legislation creates a new coverage formula, in which states with 5 
or more violations within the past fifteen years will need federal pre-clearance to make any 
changes to their voting laws (Drum 2014). This amendment also strengthens section 3 of the 
VRA, in addition to a mandate requiring states to provide notice of election procedures related to 
changes within 180 days of a federal election, the moving of a polling place and redistricting 
(Berman 2014). However, the legislation provides exemptions for voter identification laws and 
relies heavily on federal litigation as the only means of enforcement (Massoglia 2014). As such, 
there is still need to empirically examine how other voting restrictions impact voting behavior. 
This discussion is critical to unpack not only the striking down of section 4(b) and section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act, but also the recent VRA legislation proposed by Congress, as well as 
Secretary Holder’s call for the repeal of restrictions on felon voting. 
!
Voter Turnout 
 There are many causes which influences a person’s likelihood to vote. Education, age, 
and involvement in social structures are the main three variables which determine whether 
someone will vote or not (Franklin 2004). Education makes participation easier and is the 
strongest indicator of voting (Lipset 1960; Leighley & Nagler 1992). Although the positive 
correlation between higher education and voter turnout “obtains with law-like regularity” in the 
United States (Sondheimer & Green 2010), microlevel relationships between education and voter 
turnout appear to be in conflict with macro-level patterns. The main conflict is the disparity 
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between dramatic gains in educational attainment but simultaneously declining voter turnout 
since the 1960’s (Brody 1978; Sondheimer & Green 2010; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Gomez 
2008). Thus, much of the research on voter turnout and education seeks to rectify this 
discrepancy. Gomez argues voting behavior is conditional on whether the voter’s community has 
high rates of educational attainment (2008). He explains the puzzle of participation by arguing 
that increases in education have positive effects on turnout in the short run, but in the long term 
these positive gains evaporate (Gomez 2008). Additionally, although Sondheimer and Green 
initially expressed skepticism that education increases voter turnout, their social experiments on 
educational attainment and political participation, in contrast, indicate educational attainment 
does profoundly affect voter turnout (2010). Thus, while the magnitude of the effect of 
educational attainment has been questioned, more recent research indicates this relationship still 
holds true. 
  Furthermore, membership in social organizations makes it easier for people to become 
politically mobilized (Rosenstone & Hanson 1993), while age determines opportunities to 
receive education and become part of social organizations (Putnam 1995, 2000; Verba, 
Schlozman & Brady 1995). Media is also widely considered a factor in voter turnout. Kranson 
and Greene discovered in a natural experiment that while people widely report that media and 
advertising have a formidable influence on their intention to vote and turnout, there is no 
evidence that having more ads in a certain geographic locale increases turnout in that area 
(2008). The literature on voter turnout provides multiple indicators of turnout, as well as 
theoretical understandings of voting behavior. 
!
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Economic Costs of Voting 
 One of the main theoretical understandings of voter turnout focuses on the economic 
costs of voting, higher costs to voting lowers the potential benefits of voting, thus lowering 
turnout overall (Down 1957; Rosenstone & Wolfinger 1978; Highton 2004). Highton identifies 
three ways in which voting is a low-benefit activity: first, small voting costs deter people from 
voting; second, the costs for voting for nearly everyone must not be very high; and thirdly, small 
changes in the cost of voting might have sizable returns on both overall turnout and the turnout 
of certain groups (2004). 
 The economic costs to voting literature focuses on barriers which decrease the utility of 
voting. Current research on the cost of voting identifies several ways to increase turnout. Policies 
such as reducing the number of days prior to an election in which voters can register and 
allowing voters to register when they renew their license or at the polls on Election Day (Stein & 
Vonnahme 2008; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; Squire, Wolfinger & Glass 1987), voting by 
mail (Stein & Vonnahme 2008; Berinsky, Burns & Traugott 2001) and early voting (Stein & 
Vonnahme 2008; Stein 1998; Stein & Garcia-Monet 1997) all reduce costs of voting. Getting 
potential voters to register is another barrier, which more frequently affects less educated voters; 
thus, making registration easier would increase voter turnout (Rosenstone & Wolfinger 1978). 
Similarly, voting by mail is another way to decrease voting barriers, but while it does increase 
turnout at the aggregate level, it does not make the electorate more reflective of the voting-age 
population (Berinsky, Burns & Traugott 2001). Other research argues for Election Day 
Registration, which would allow voters to register and vote on Election Day. Scholarly analysis 
of Election Day Registration shows that allowing voters to register on election day increases 
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voter turnout in a statistically significant way, by at least 7% or more (McDonald 2008; Mitchell 
and Wlezien 1995; Knack 1995; Rhine 1996; Highton 1997).  Election Day registration would 
most benefit voters who have recently moved, which tends to be a group of younger, more 
racially diverse people, who are slightly more aligned with the Democratic party (McDonald 
2008, 498). While Election Day Registration as well as the lessening of voter barriers would 
mitigate these voters negative propensity to vote, they are still intrinsically less likely to vote 
(McDonald 2008, 496).  However, other studies argue that even if voting is made easier through 
the reduction of barriers or costs, the best way to increase turnout is to increase political 
information and interest (Berinsky 2005). 
 Mobilization, which is the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups 
induce other people to participate, has been viewed as a way to reduce the cost of barriers to 
voting (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). Rosenstone and Hansen argue that political participation 
arises from the interaction of citizens and political mobilizers, it is is a way to elucidate the 
utility of voting. However, when attempting to explain the decrease in voter turnout, Goldstein & 
Ridout found no decrease in mobilization and thus cannot explain the decrease of voter turnout 
(2002). Thus, their findings indicate that mobilization and GOTV efforts have redirected their 
efforts toward their strongest supporters, those who would vote regardless of contact with 
political mobilizers. Therefore, mobilization efforts, as well as the voters they contact is 
important to consider in regard to the economic costs of voting. 
!
Voting as a Behavior 
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 Franklin’s extensive study on voter turnout departs from this economic view, in favor of a 
more behaviorally focused understanding of voter turnout. Franklin (2004) argues that the habit 
of voting is established early in adult life, therefore making newly enfranchised voters largely 
responsible for trends in voter turnout. Moreover, socialization plays a large part in establishing 
the habit of voting but at the aggregate level, changes in voting behavior will occur slowly 
(Franklin 2004, 22). Thus, while there are many independent causes that increase voter turnout, 
these changes are slow because the habit of voting is established early in life.  
 Similar to Franklin, Pacheco’s research on political socialization and youth voter turnout 
looks at the context of electoral behavior, specifically whether political competition affects 
turnout. His research suggests that political competition is positively correlated with youth voter 
turnout while local education attainment or contextual education is negatively correlated 
(Pacheco 2008). Moreover, such research finds that home political environment is the strongest 
predictor of youth voter turnout, political context and political competitiveness still increase 
voter turnout among youth (Pacheco 2008). His research also found that competitive locales are 
less likely to be ethnically diverse, which may have implications for minority redistricting. By 
understanding voting as a behavior, my research examines how voting restrictions alter or 
eliminate the voting patterns of minorities, as well as other socioeconomic groups. 
 
Voter Identification Laws 
Context of Voter Identification Laws 
 Since Shelby County v. Holder has weakened the Voting Rights Act, many states have 
moved to adopt stricter voting laws such as voter identification laws. Currently, six states are 
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attempting or already have voter identification laws. North Carolina passed a law requiring North 
Carolina issued state identification in order to vote, while shortening early voting by a week and 
eliminating same-day registration and pre-registration for those under 18 (Zucchino 2013, A24). 
Similarly, Texas has passed a voter identification law that rejects student IDs as a valid form of 
identification, a measure also present in the North Carolina law (Zucchino 2013, A24). Florida, 
who already has a state law requiring voters to show photo identification (Drew 2007), is also 
intending on purging non-citizens from the voting rolls in an attempt to protect others from 
diluting the “sacred right to vote” (Mishak 2013). Arizona and Kansas are trying to implement a 
two-tier voting system which requires voters to provide proof of citizenship in order to receive a 
full ballot, with those unable to provide proof of citizenship only being able to vote in federal 
elections (Hiatt 2013). What is important to note about much of these identification laws, is the 
implementation date of these restrictions, most of which will not take effect until until the 2014 
election cycle. Thus, my study will look at past empirical data on the effect of current 
identification requirements. Indiana for instance requires that registered voters present a federal 
or Indiana state document with a photo, expiration date and the same name as on their voter-
registration (Hershey 2009, 88). Federal law only requires first time voters to provide 
verification, while about half the states in the U.S. require all voters to present documentation 
(Drew 2007). Thus, we see a discrepancy between state voting laws and federal voting law. 
Therefore, one must ask whether this discrepancy creates an economic cost that decreases the 
likelihood of voting. 
  
The Costs of Voter Identification Restrictions 
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 The discrepancy between state and federal voting identification law has serious 
ramifications for those who are unable to produce identification for a multitude of reasons. In 
North Carolina, an estimated 600,000 out of 6.6 million registered voters did not possess a North 
Carolina state-issued identification card, a requirement under their new voter identification law, 
leaving nine percent of registered voters unable to vote (Mishak 2013; North Carolina State 
Board of Elections 2012). Similarly in Florida, the state initially pulled a list of 180,000 
registered voters that were potential non-citizens, based on comparisons between driver license 
records and voter registration data, the list was significantly lowered to only 2,600 people but 
even many of those people were found to be citizens (Mishak 2013). Likewise, when Arizona 
turned away 31,000 registered voters from the polls due to their lack of a driver’s license or 
passport, 90% of those turned away were United States citizens (Savage 2013, A1). Thus, we see 
that when states attempt to enforce stricter identification requirements in an attempt to stop voter 
fraud, these attempts prevent citizens from enacting electoral representation. Additionally, the 
effect of voter identification laws disproportionately affects minorities. One study found that 
while aggregate turnout only decreased by 3% in states that imposed identification requirements, 
the impact was two to three times more for minorities (Drew 2007). Therefore, not only do voter 
identification laws fail to prevent voter fraud, it also disproportionately affects minority voters. 
My research seeks to expand on these findings, as well as determine other groups that could be 
affected by voter identification requirements. 
!
The Effects of Redistricting and Gerrymandering 
Redistricting 
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 Some studies have looked at the effects of redistricting in terms of political information, 
turnout and election outcomes. In regard to whether or not districts conform to natural 
communities or neighborhoods, one study found that while carving voters outside of their 
perceived communities have lower political knowledge. However, statistically those districted in 
their natural communities do not have higher turnout than those outside of their natural 
communities (Winburn & Wagner 2010). Alternatively, Friedman and Holden when trying to 
determine the cause for the rise in incumbent reelection rates argue that redistricting decreases 
the likelihood of incumbent reelection (2009, 609). 
!
Racial Gerrymandering and Majority-Minority Mandates 
 Most of the legal literature on gerrymandering and race has focused on identifying what 
constitutes racial gerrymandering and what kinds of gerrymandering are permissible under the 
current legal structure (O’Loughlin 1982; Halpin & Engstrom 1973). Similarly, some have 
evaluated whether racial gerrymandering produces favorable outcomes for voters and politicians 
(Lowenstein 1998). 
 Political literature on gerrymandering and voter turnout has focused on the effects of 
racial gerrymandering, redistricting on the basis on minority populations. The mandate of 
majority-minority districts is an important aspect of this, which requires that states redistrict in 
order to create a high population or majority of minorities within a district. One model, looking 
at partisan outcomes, found that with optimal partisan gerrymandering, a majority minority 
mandate is more likely to hurt Democrats because it causes potential Democratic votes to be 
wasted (Shotts 2001). Another study looking at the effects of majority-minority mandates on 
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turnout examined the effect of majority Latino voting on voter turnout of Latinos and non-
Hispanics, finding that Latinos vote more in a majority Hispanic district while non-Hispanics are 
less likely to turn out in such districts (Barreto, Segura & Woods 2004). A similar study looking 
at majority-minority districts and voter turnout examined African American and white turnout, 
finding that the election of blacks to Congress decreases white participation while making small 
but negligible increases to black participation (Gay 2001). Thus, both studies consistently find 
that majority-minority districts decrease white turnout, but the magnitude of increases in 
minority turnout is disputed throughout the literature. My study seeks to resolve or further 
examine the disputed magnitude of the effect of non-white districts and non-white candidates on 
minority and white turnout.  
!
Felon Disenfranchisement 
 Scholarly studies on the effects of felon disenfranchisement on voting outcomes has 
primarily looked at how enfranchising felons would impact partisan outcomes, rather than on 
overall turnout. One study estimated that overall felon turnout would be 18% lower than 
aggregate turnout, and that felon disenfranchisement has provided a small but clear advantage for 
the Republican party (Manza & Uggen 2004). Other studies have examined the impact of felon 
re-enfranchisement on overall turnout and what groups are negatively impacted by felon 
disenfranchisement, such as black men. Miles (2004) argues that while African-American men 
are disproportionately disenfranchised, their disenfranchisement has no distinct effect on either 
electoral or voting outcomes; rather, the preference of ex-felons is abstention from voting and 
thus ex-felon disenfranchisement has no impact on voter turnout. Therefore, there is a 
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discrepancy in the literature between different models that predict voting and electoral outcomes 
if felons are re-enfranchised. Thus, what is missing is a discussion on the magnitude of felon re-
enfranchisement and whether such disenfranchisement can be viewed as potential voting 
discrimination. This discussion is especially relevant in regard to Attorney General Holder’s 
support for the repeal of all state laws that restrict felon voting even after they’ve been released 
from prison (Goldman 2014). 
!
Methods 
 For my analysis, I used the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a 50,000+ 
person national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov Polimetrix from 2008 and 
2012. I also included statistics from Manza and Uggen illustrating the voting restrictions for 
felons by state. I coded the variable Felon Disenfranchisement from 0 to 4, 0 being no voting 
restrictions for felons, 1 is coded as restrictions on inmates only, 2 being disenfranchisement of 
inmates and parolees, 3 is restrictions on inmates, parolees and probationers and 4 being the 
complete disenfranchisement of inmates, parolees, probationers and some or all felons. 
  For voter identification requirements, I have collected data from the National Conference 
of State Legislatures. I coded the variable Voter Identification Requirements from 0 to 3, 0 being 
only federal requirements for voting, 1 being non-strict non-photo ID, 2 being strict non-photo 
ID and 3 requiring strict photo identification to cast a ballot. A strict requirement is when a state 
will not allow a voter to cast a valid ballot without additional identification. Therefore, for a 
person without the requirements to vote, they must cast a provisional ballot which requires 
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further identity verification. A photo requirement is when a state requires photo identification to 
cast a valid ballot (National Conference of State Legislatures). 
 To operationalize the impact of minority-majority impacts, I used the race of the house 
member from the CCES data. While it is an indirect measurement, it captures the impact of 
minority representation on minority turnout, which is a goal of minority-majority mandates. 
Thus, it allows for an evaluation of the effectiveness of these regulations. 
 To allow for an analysis both at the state level and congressional level, I aggregated the 
50,000+ person sample from the CCES to the level of the state and congressional district, 
creating four separate models: 2012 State, 2012 Congressional District, 2008 State, and 2008 
Congressional District. By collapsing turnout and registration rates to the level of the state and 
congressional district, I am able to determine if my independent variables cause the mean turnout 
in a specific state or district to decrease or increase in a statistically significant way.  
 An issue of validity is that voter turnout reporting is unusually high in the CCES as the 
sample tends to be more politically interested as a group (J. Wolak, personal communication, 
February 24, 2014). Thus, self-reported turnout in the CCES does not mirror validated voting 
records. This has  led to some spurious and under-valued correlations in my state and 
congressional level analysis, that should be considered in understanding the statistical 
significance of the results. Figure 1 illustrates overall turnout, nonwhite turnout and voter 
registration rates in the CCES sample in 2008 and 2012 compared to the General Election 
turnout rates. For 2008, the CCES provided a verified voting and registration record but in 2012 
did not, thus figures for 2012 reflect self-reported turnout which usually tends to be higher than 
actual turnout, in this case by a large percentage. 
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!
Figure 1 (McDonald 2008 & 2012; CCES 2008 & 2012)	

1 validated voting record	

2 self-reported voting 
Results 
The Effect of Voter Identification and Felon Disenfranchisement Restrictions on Voter 
Turnout 
 In both 2008 and 2012, minority turnout and registration is negatively impacted by the 
presence of felon voting restrictions. Voter identification restrictions also negatively impact non-
white turnout and registration. While there is a notable decrease in nonwhite vote when either 
felon disenfranchisement regulations or voter identification requirements are present, the 
presence of both of these restrictions simultaneously further strengthens this decrease in 
nonwhite and latino turnout. This suggests that these regulations create a climate that is not 
amicable to minority voting, an environment in which electoral access is stifled. 
 This hostile voting environment also has implications for voting behavior of 
independents and less educated people, as well as turnout overall. In 2008 and 2012, independent 











2008 67.93% 59.43% 79.66% 62.2%
2008 73.31% 75.16% 92.81%
2012 93.24% 90.57% 93.14% 58.7%
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Figure 2
The Effect of Voter Identification Requirements on Electoral 
Outcomes
Race 2008 Vote 2008 Voter Registration
2012 Vote 2012 Voter 
Registration
White -.007 (.01) -.001 (.01) .003 (.00) .007 (.01)
Nonwhite or Latino -.035 (.02) * -.015 (.01) .0003 (.01) -.011 (.01)
White Non-Hispanic - - .004 (.00) .007 (.01)
Non White, Non-
Hispanic
- - .0004 (.01) -.012 (.02)
Income
Under $25,000 -.016 (.01) -.017 (01) .005 (.01) .005 (.01)
Under $50,000 -.011 (.01) -.007 (.01) .006 (.01) .008 (.69)
Under $100,000 -.010 (.01) -.005 (.01) .005 (.01) .007 (.01)
Over $100,000 -.004 (.01) .005 (.01) -.001 (.00) -.010 (.01)
Age
18-34 -.014 (.03) * 0.14 (.01) .009 (.01) .015 (.87)
35-54 -.006 (.01) -.003 (.01) .000 (.00) -.002 (01)
55+ .005 (.01) .006 (.01) .003 (.00) .007 (.01)
Party ID
Democrat .049 (.04) .000 (.00) .002 (.01) -
Republican -.005 (.01) -.038 (.03) -.001 (.00) -
Independent .018 (.03) -.003 (.00) * .0001 (.00) -
Education
No College -.009 (.01) -.001 (.01) .008 (.01) .010 (.01)
Some College -.008 (.01) -.002 (.00) .001 (.00) .001 (01)
No College Degree -.008 (.01) -.003 (.01) .004 (.01) .011 (.01)
Undergraduate Degree -.012 (.01) -.0002 (00) -.004 (.01) -.004 (.01)!
3 Non-hispanic indicates that hispanic or latino origin or ethnicity 
was not accounted for in regression analysis
coefficient 
(standard error)
* indicates p < .1
Conway !  17
Figure 3
The Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Restrictions on Electoral 
Outcomes
Race 2008 Vote 2008 Voter Registration
2012 Vote 2012 Voter 
Registration
White -.013 (.01) * -.004 (.00) -.002 (.00) -.008 (.01)
Nonwhite or Latino -.022 (.02) * -.022 (.01) * -.006 (.00) -.029 (.01)
White Non-Hispanic - - -.002 (.00) -.007 (.01)
Non White, Non-
Hispanic
- - -.006 (.00) -.028 (.01)
Income
Under $25,000 -.025 (.01) * -.015 (.01) -.002 (.01) -.002 (.02)
Under $50,000 -.015 (.01) * -.008 (.01) -.006 (.01) -.005 (.01)
Under $100,000 -.016 (.01) * -.007 (.00) -.002 (.00) -.007 (01)
Over $100,000 -.005 (.01) -.0003 (.00) -.001 (.00) -.013 (.01)
Age
18-34 -.019 (.01) * -.012 (.01) -.004 (.01) -.026 (.01)
35-54 -.012 (.01) * -.005 (.01) -.002 (.00) .008 (.01)
55+ -.011 (.01) -.002 (.00) .001 (.00) -.003 (.01)
Party ID
Democrat .012 (.04) -.001 (.00) -.001 (.00) -
Republican -.0004 (.00) .025 (.02) .001 (.00) -
Independent -.025 (.02) .001 (.00) -.008 (.00) * -
Education
No College -.004 (.01) -.010 (.01) -.008 (.01) .0003 (.01)
Some College -.017 (.01) * -.0002 (.00) .001 (.00) -.011 (.01)
No College Degree -.009 (.01) -.005 (.01) -.001 (.01) -.005 (.01)
Undergraduate Degree -.015 (.01) * -.0005 (.00) -.009 (.01) -.009 (.01)
coefficient 
(standard error)
* indicates p < .1
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vote is negatively impacted by felon disenfranchisement. Additionally, felon disenfranchisement 
negatively impacts voters with lower rates of educational attainment, especially those without 
higher education. Paradoxically, felon disenfranchisement also decreases vote among those with 
undergraduate degrees, however, the effect is more significant among voters with only some 
college education. Moreover, both felon disenfranchisement and voter identification laws reduce 
turnout in 18 to 34 year olds, with felon disenfranchisement also reducing voter turnout amongst 
35 to 55 year olds. Not only do these regulations negatively impact a range of socioeconomic 
groups, their effect is also compounding as it decreases non-white turnout even more when both 
restrictions are present at the state level. Therefore, my findings suggest that these current 
restrictions, as well as future ones can have further negative impacts upon electoral access. 
!
The Effect of Non-White Congressional Representation on Electoral Outcomes 
 There was little evidence the presence of a nonwhite house member increases nonwhite 
turnout, but rather non-white and latino turnout was suppressed in 2012 in the presence of a non-
white house member. There is also a negative correlation between nonwhite house members and 
voter turnout among less educated voters. The effect is most significant in regard to the voting 
rates of those without college degrees. However, this finding is not consistent with voter 
registration rates among the less educated, which are negative in 2008 but positive in 2012. This 
may be due to the over-reporting of registration in 2012. These findings suggest that the 
mobilization of voters by a non-white house member may only be among the higher educated. 
 Additionally, there is a negative correlation between the presence of a non-white house 
member and lower rates of voting among voters with less than $100,000 in total family income 
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Figure 4
The Effect of Non-White Congressional Representation on 
Electoral Outcomes
Race
2008 Vote 2008 Voter 
Registration
2012 Vote 2012 Voter 
Registration
White -.001 (.01) -.011 (.10) -.011 (.02) .042 (.03)
Nonwhite or Latino -.032 (.03) -.016 (.02) -.005 (.01) .03 (.02) *
White Non-Hispanic (1) - - -.006 (.01) .045 (.02) *
Non White, Non-
Hispanic - - -.013 (.02) 0.041 (.03)
Income
Under $25,000 -.020 (.03) .050 (.03) * -.019 (.02) .038 (.03)
Under $50,000 -.023 (.02) -.008 (02) -.002 (.01) .024 (.02)
Under $100,000 -.055 (.01) * -.016 (.01) -.004 (.01) .025 (.01) *
Over $100,000 -.006 (.02) .009 (.01) -.001 (.01) -.001 (.02)
Age
18-34 -.068 (.02) * -.006 (.02) -.021 (.01) .044 (.02) *
35-54 -.024 (.02 ) -.024 (.01) * -.009 (.01) -.009 (.02)
55+ -.042 (.02) * -.013 (.01) -.004 (.01) -.003 (.02)
Party ID
Democrat .008 (02) .001 (.00) -.004 (.01) -
Republican -.006 (01) -.023 (.01) * -.017 (.01) * -
Independent -.056 (.03)  * .001 (.00) -.044 (.01) * -
Education
No College -.069 (.02) * -.006 (.02) -.012 (.01) .063 (.03) *
Some College -.027 (.01) * -.019 (.01) * -.012 (.01) * .039 (.02) *
No College Degree -.06 (.01) * -.021 (.01) * -.011 (.01) .07 (.00) *
Undergraduate Degree -.021 (.01) -.006 (.01) -.008 (.01) .009 (.02)
coefficient 
(standard error) * indicates p < .1
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per year. Therefore, majority-minority mandates have implications for both lower and middle 
income brackets. Such impacts are similar to the registration rates of those making less than 
$25,000 in total family income. Less than $25,000 of family income is the poverty line in the 
U.S., which suggests that those with less economic resources and have a non-white 
Congressional Representative are less likely to vote. 
 Moreover, the presence of a non-white member is correlated with a decrease in 
republican voting and voter registration as well as lower rates of voting among independents.  
This effect is to be expected, as much of the literature on majority-minority mandates argues that 
such regulations generally create outcomes that favor democratic candidates.  
 The magnitude of the effect of high minority districts is disputed widely in the literature, 
with most arguing that high minority mandates have a negligible effect on minority vote. My 
analysis confirms that the effect of having a non-white house member does not have a 
consistently large impact or a statistically significant impact. This suggests that incentives 
designed to increase minority representation and electoral access fail to increase nonwhite and 
Latino voter turnout rates. If governments are restricting and limiting the ability for people to 
exercise their voting rights while also creating failed incentives for better representation, then 
there exists a failure of democratic representation. 
!
Discussion 
 My findings suggest that voter identification laws and felon disenfranchisement create 
barriers to electoral access. This suggests that the current wave of increasing voter requirements 
across the U.S. has devastating implications for future voting protections as well as future 
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electoral outcomes. Moreover, felon disenfranchisement not only restricts voting of those with a 
felony conviction, but also creates adverse conditions for electoral participation. As such, the re-
enfranchisement of felons will not only restore electoral access to a marginalize political group, 
it also will remove barriers for the electorate as a whole. Additionally, my analysis on the effect 
of non-white House representation shows that policies aimed at increasing non-white 
representation do not significantly increase voter turnout. This has implications for majority-
minority mandates, as well as for understanding the effects of voting policy. 
 Looking forward with these findings in mind, many voter identification requirements 
including those passed by North Carolina, do not go into effect until the 2014 elections, and thus 
my research foreshadows lower rates of minority and youth turnout, as well as lower turnout 
overall. The negative impact of these regulations on youth turnout is especially significant in 
regard to Franklin’s finding that voting behavior is established early in political life. 
Consequently, since youth voter turnout on average is significantly affected by the presence of all 
three of my independent variables, this indicates that these regulations effectively disenfranchise 
these voters in the beginnings of their political involvement as well as throughout their whole 
life. Therefore, future research is required to examine the effect of these restrictive requirements 
on 2014 midterm and 2016 presidential electoral outcomes.  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